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THE MILITARY IN CENTRAL AMERICA: 
THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSITION 
The armed forces of Central America have been important and often decisive 
political actors over the last 15 years. In three cases - El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua - this importance derives immediately from the 
waging of civil war, where operational considerations came to determine 
much of public policy. However, in all the countries the military were 
influential in politics before the generalisation of the conflict in the mid-
19708. In Guatemala this dominance has a particularly long history and 
appears to transcend alterations in the ideological landscape at home and 
abroad. In other cases, such as Panama and Honduras, the influence of the 
soldiery emerged much later and proved to be ideologically more malleable, 
albeit highly resilient in strictly institutional terms. Nicaragua has manifested 
a persistent strain of partisan armies (Liberal and Constitutionalist until the 
1920s; Guardia Nacional (GN) and Sandino's nationalist guerrillas; Ejercito 
Popular Sandinista and the contras), each linked more or less directly to an 
ideological current since the 1850s. In the case of El Salvador, a most 
energetic and confident civilian political elite was displaced from 
administration of the central state by officers in the 1930s, and when they 
returned thanks to US pressure 50 years later even the most reactionary 
elements remained prey to the military lobby, which retained important 
powers of veto. 
Whilst open military dictatorships of a type frequently encountered in 
South America were to be found in the isthmus before the wars of the 1980s, 
such regimes were not common outside of Honduras or Panama, where harsh 
repression was not visited upon the popular sectors. Instead, the pattern was 
of armies either establishing their own 'front parties' (Partido Institucional 
Democratico (PID) in Guatemala; Partido de Conciliation Nacional (PCN) 
in El Salvador; to some degree Partido Revolucionario Democratico (PRD) 
in Panama) or engaging in variable civilian alliances (Partido Nacional (PN) 
in Honduras; Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN) in Guatemala) or 
providing the coercive wing of a more integrated/corporatist political system, 
as in the case of Nicaragua under both the Somozas (GN) and the Frente 
Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) (Ejercito Popular Sandinista -
EPS). It is worthy of note that during the 1980s, when military operations 
extended throughout the isthmus and fierce fighting took place in three of its 
states, it was only in Guatemala that open military dictatorship prevailed for 
any length of time (Rios Montt and Mejia Victores, 1982-85). 
This fact is frequently interpreted as a reflection of US influence - which 
is assuredly the case - but it should also be seen as reflecting a longer-term 
local pattern of 'mixed regime' in which the division of coercive, ideological 
and administrative labour differs not only from the classic prescriptions of 
liberal democracy, but also from the experience of the rest of Latin America 
(with some partial exceptions in the cases of Mexico and Paraguay). Such a 
local pattern prior to the 1980s might be explained by a combination of small 
military establishments - no army over 15,000 strong, no significant navy or 
(outside Honduras) air-force; the relatively narrow set of managerial controls 
required for plantation-based societies; the extreme difficulty of securing 
institutional anonymity (and even caste-like differentiation) in small nation-
states. One important consequence of such a pattern - especially after the 
formidable expansion of the military in the 1980s - has been the renegotiation 
of the precise parameters of institutional responsibilities, it often requiring 
major conflict to achieve what appear from the outside to be distinctly minor 
alterations. However, because the exercise of the military fuero has generally 
been most decisive at the margins we will here address these matters of detail 
at greater length than some might consider justifiable. Equally, whilst the 
military may be monolithic in both its self-image and the eyes of its (many) 
victims and critics, one has to recognise the organisational (and sometimes 
ideological) stress caused in recent years which is conducive to internal 
differentiation. 
During the 1980s the combination of severe social conflict, increased US 
influence and correspondingly enhanced international attention served either 
completely to destroy or to alter the internal balance of the region's regimes. 
This process, which effectively began in 1978 with the FSLN offensive in 
Nicaragua and a marked upturn in violence in El Salvador and Guatemala, 
sharpened recognition of the importance of regional strategy within Central 
American armies. However, neither Somoza's tardy pleas nor Washington's 
rather disorganised efforts to revive the regional defence system 
(CONDECA), which lacked a real operational core, served to produce a 
significant shift towards centralised military coordination. Such collaboration 
as was identifiable related to intelligence matters and ad hoc operations in 
border areas, such as the infamous Rio Sumpul massacre of 1980 involving 
Salvadorean and Honduran troops. The cool relations between the 
Salvadoreans and Hondurans caused by the 1969 war were, though, not 
properly repaired by the 1980 treaty over the frontier; relations between 
Honduras and Nicaragua lacked an historic or cultural animosity to 
complement ideological antagonism; right-wing Guatemalan nationalism 
overlapped sufficiently with radical Sandinismo to complicate support for 
Washington against the FSLN, whilst the Guatemalan officers were able to 
keep their distance from the noisily US-dominated operations in El Salvador, 
where most of the fighting was away from their shared border. 
Although events since 1987 have made public much material and 
information on the armed forces, a great deal of military activity still has to 
be analysed outside normal scholarly procedures. This naturally increases the 
premium on anecdotal and impressionistic sources as well as rooted 
assumptions/prejudices for which no countervailing evidence yet presents 
itself. As a result, our paper echoes much civilian material on the military in 
addition to courting the risks of speculating about contemporary events at a 
time of change. There is, however, a very strong case for attempting to 
assess the specifically institutional features of civil-military relations in a 
period of political change, when short-term arrangements and matters of 
detail acquire enhanced importance. It is both for this reason and because it 
is still too early to hazard the construction of a serious model for relations 
between the state and civil society for the post-conflict era that the analysis 
here is on the military apparatuses themselves. Moreover, we have not here 
focused on the role of the USA which arguably provides much of the 
framework within which the shifting relations of power have been disputed. 
However, even if one must accept the importance of North American 
'circumscription' of Central American affairs, there is no corresponding need 
to subscribe to those (generally North American) theories which ascribe a 
preordained logistical 'logic' to isthmian developments and which see the 
'invisible hand' of Washington behind every major move in the region. The 
picture we paint is one of difference, detail and, often, fluidity. The 
enormous weight of US influence seems, by contrast, to have been directed 
in this period towards cajoling regional actors into negotiating in general 
rather than to determining the precise nature of the matters that are the 
concern of this paper. 
El Salvador 
The military settlement in El Salvador is distinctive in a number of ways. 
First, it stemmed from a strategic impasse on the battlefield, and thus must 
be seen as involving two military institutions (the armed forces of the state 
and the rebel Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional - FMLN). 
Secondly, it resulted from sharp, direct and public pressure from Washington 
on San Salvador. But in threatening to withdraw its patronage the USA was 
no more able to enforce precise decisions than it had been over the previous 
decade, when it was almost unreservedly supporting the state against the 
guerrillas. Thirdly, the negotiation (1990-91) and implementation (1992-94) 
of the settlement depended heavily on the United Nations (UN), which in both 
New York and San Salvador (ONUSAL) interpreted its notably broad brief 
in a dynamic and usually innovative manner. Finally, the terms for ending the 
twelve year civil war formally agreed at Chapultepec Castle, Mexico, in 
January 1992 themselves embodied substantial structural changes to the 
military institutions as well as laying out a procedural framework for 
demobilisation and transition. 
These changes involved the total demobilisation and disarmament of the 
FMLN; the (constitutional) removal from the armed forces of all normal 
police functions; the dismantling of the five Rapid Response Infantry 
Battalions (BIRIs) created during the 1980s as the army's 'shock-troops'; a 
substantial (40-50%) reduction of the military's overall enlistment; the 
abolition of the military intelligence service (Departamento Nacional de 
Inteligencia - DNI), to be replaced by a civilian body (Oficina de Inteligencia 
del Estado - OIE); the dismantling of the powerful paramilitary security 
forces - Guardia Nacional (GN) and Policia de Hacienda (PH) - and the quite 
extensive Civil Defence and territorial reserves; the establishment of a new 
National Civil Police (PNC), to include significant numbers of ex-FMLN 
fighters and personnel from the existing Policia Nacional (PN), itself to be 
phased out by October 1994. At the same time, the Chapultepec agreement 
gave great weight to the establishment of two investigative commissions - the 
Ad Hoc Commission (composed of Salvadoreans) to investigate the human 
rights and professional records of individual members of the army's officer 
corps, and the 'Truth Commission' (composed of non-Salvadoreans) to 
investigate and publicly identify human rights abuses by all parties since 
1980, during which time some 75,000 people had been killed.1 
It is worth noting that the Accords did not allow for the integration of the 
FMLN into a new military apparatus. Neither did they provide for a civilian 
defence minister, legislative oversight of the details of the military budget or 
promotions and postings. Equally, they did not address the issue of military 
control of a string of state bodies regulating infrastructure and 
communications.2 Nonetheless, the implementation of the accords in 1992-
93, whilst uneven and hotly contested, was largely successful in the narrow 
military terms that concern us here. This achievement should not, however, 
be interpreted as corresponding to a broadly applicable model; it is derived, 
rather, from general policies and instruments for settling a conflict that was 
as violent as those in Guatemala and Nicaragua, but possessed its own 
particular character. This is perhaps best summarised as a developing 
stalemate between 1981 and 1989 between the Salvadorean armed forces, the 
FMLN and the USA in which the civilian interests/allies/components of each 
of these actors clashed with further pursuit of purely coercive activity for 
both internal and external reasons. 
By 1990 there were very good military as well as political reasons for 
Washington to accept a cease-fire. The expenditure of $1,020 million in 
military aid to El Salvador since 1980 had produced some very poor results 
indeed. There had been modest progress towards realising the slogan of 
'KSSSS' - 'Keep it simple, sustainable, small and Salvadorean' - and even 
before the FMLN offensive of November 1989 it was plain that the US 
Military Group had failed to achieve the three core aims it had set in 1981: 
i) that the Salvadorean officer corps subordinate itself to civilian authority; 
ii) that it respect human rights; and iii) that it 'rationalise its own internal 
methods of governance so that talent was nurtured, success was rewarded, 
incompetents were weeded out, and the officer corps became operationally 
effective'.3 In November 1989 the indiscriminate aerial strafing of the 
capital's tugurios combined with the patently planned execution of the Jesuit 
priests was so similar to the methods employed almost nine years earlier - the 
massacre of El Mozote and the killing of the Maryknoll nuns - that it was 
difficult to credit that in the interim the military had been expanded sixfold 
(regular forces from 7,250 to 43,500; paramilitary forces from 5,000 to 
12,600); that 1,000 had been trained in the USA and at least 60 US advisors 
had worked near (sometimes on) the 'front line' for eight years; or that its 
equipment had been comprehensively upgraded (to include 42 combat aircraft 
and 27 armed helicopters).4 Whereas in the early 1980s the trading in 
Washington of military aid (wanted by the Reagan administration) for formal 
human rights 'conditionally' (required, then requested, by Congress) was a 
theatre that suited both parties - as the executive and Salvadorean military 
bluntly recognised - this was now neither diplomatically nor operationally 
viable. Moreover, the long-standing conviction amongst Salvadorean officers 
that Washington would continue to fund the war effort regardless, because of 
its immovable anti-communism, was no longer justified and was even 
provocative to the North Americans.5 
The FMLN's interest in a settlement stemmed, of course, from the 
reasonable expectation that its offensive would guarantee a negotiated reward 
whereas the full capture of state power by force was no longer viable or - for 
some - desirable.6 Equally, the rebels' relatively low reliance on external 
allies made the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, and then Sandinismo, an 
important but not decisive issue. In terms of their own military objectives the 
key issue was 'purification' of the state army - long seen as intrinsically 
necessary and a prerequisite for fusion with FMLN forces. This purge was 
not only necessary, in the eyes of the FMLN, because of the general levels 
of brutality exhibited by the state forces - over half of the 482 bodies found 
at El Mozote were of children - but also because whilst the rebels generally 
observed the Geneva Convention (the exceptions are individually identified), 
the government forces did not: not a single rebel prisoner of war was taken 
between January 1980 and July 1982 (during which time 34,000 people were 
killed).7 However, in September 1990 the rebels suddenly proposed complete 
demilitarisation along Costa Rican lines. This was rejected and in November 
UN negotiator Alvaro de Soto made a confidential counter-proposal that 
called for the abolition of the two paramilitary forces and the military 
intelligence service together with investigation of human rights violations and 
removal of those responsible.8 The UN proposal coincided almost exactly 
with the halving of US military aid by Congress because of inaction over the 
Jesuit killings, and it was immediately followed by a string of fierce FMLN 
attacks that badly mauled the military. The first part of de Soto's proposals 
was agreed in Mexico in April 1991, and in September of that year the 
FMLN finally accepted that it could not win both a purge of the armed forces 
and the inclusion of its own cadre within a reformed institution, settling 
instead for the purge and some representation in the Policia Nacional Civil 
(PNC). 
The army itself resisted any negotiation until May 1990, but it was already 
prey to increased civilian pressure over the cost of the war - not least in 
terms of military corruption - amidst sharp economic recession. It also 
confronted the proven inability of first the large-scale 'hammer and anvil' 
and then the more mobile 'cazador' strategies. Lastly, of course, it faced the 
tangible threat of a US pull-out, raising a spectre that had plenty of 
precedents for those more inclined to celebrate than denounce US 
intervention. Moreover, with the capture of the high command by the 1966 
Tandona graduating class in late 1988 and the election of the ARENA 
government in March 1989 the most belligerent civil-military alliance was 
now in power and yet was palpably failing to secure a result. The seven-year 
excuse provided by the Christian Democrats had gone. For many in ARENA 
the purely political challenge posed by the FMLN would be slight whereas 
the military's veto on cease-fire talks restricted the rebels to a sphere where 
their destructive capacity was high.9 De Soto's proposals and the 1991 
agreements certainly posed a grave threat to many in the officer corps, but, 
as we have seen, they also fell short of a total dismantling of the institution. 
They effectively separated a partisan high command closely associated with 
death-squad activity, command of the paramilitary forces and direction of the 
massacres of the early 1980s from a now large - 2,300 - officer corps for 
which the reasonable prospect of institutional survival, peace, US support and 
more modest (but more solid) funding was evidently an acceptable exchange 
for selective expulsions without any intake of ex-guerrillas. 
The arrangements for demobilisation proceeded with only two short delays 
- in June and November 1992 - caused by government efforts to evade the 
letter of the Accords on other matters. By 15 December the entire rebel force 
was disbanded, and the FMLN command reported to the UN that it had 
surrendered all its arsenal. However, an explosion in the Santa Rosa 
neighbourhood of Managua on 23 May 1993 revealed a hidden cache there, 
greatly embarrassing both the ex-guerrilla leadership and the UN, which 
subsequently collected weapons from another 128 sites in El Salvador, 
Nicaragua and Honduras that accounted for almost a third of the total rebel 
arsenal.10 UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali called this the 'gravest 
violation of the peace accords', and it confirmed a predictable response by 
the guerrillas to the risk of completely disbanding themselves whilst their 
erstwhile enemy was only reduced in size and thereby acquired, for the first 
time in 15 years, a monopoly on armed force. The energy and 
interventionism of ONUSAL was aimed at alleviating this natural fear, which 
was, in fact, not without real foundation. Although the seventh ONUSAL 
report - for the first quarter of 1993 - identified only six politically-
motivated killings and 32 resulting from robbery, by June the national human 
rights commission (CDHES) reported 308 illegal killings (against 225 in all 
1992), and in the first week of November five senior FMLN figures were 
shot in an apparently concerted operation by at least one death squad.11 This 
development was considered sufficiently serious to the precarious state of the 
law nearly a year after rebel demobilisation that Boutros-Ghali sent his envoy 
Marrack Goulding to San Salvador and ordered an ONUSAL investigation 
whilst Cristiani, claiming sovereignty for the judiciary, established a state 
investigation and called in bi-lateral foreign aid. However, the risks attached 
to repudiating the UN precisely at the moment when the transition it had 
brokered was in greatest danger were apparent to the most novice politician. 
ONUSAL was reincorporated into the process, and the issue of death-squad 
activity moved into the formal political arena (now agitated by an election 
campaign), where allegations of past ties became sharper with the publication 
of US documentation.12 
Demobilisation of government forces produced a reduction of the total 
military from a claimed 63,175 (in reality probably 55,000) to some 31,000 
personnel. A good proportion of this reduction came from the paramilitary 
security forces (GN and PH), which the government first attempted to retain 
simply by changing their names and legal status, provoking a halt in FMLN 
demobilisation and sharp ONUSAL intervention, but by the end of June 1992 
they had been abolished, most non-conscripted troops entering a new Policia 
Militar. Similarly, the army's five 'elite' battalions (BIRIs) were dismantled, 
some troops being redeployed, others re-entering civil society. Perhaps more 
telling, the formal abolition of the controversial military intelligence agency 
(DNI, often seen as central to death-squad activity) in June 1992 produced 
not a single applicant for posts in its civilian successor, which likewise 
inherited no files.13 In a similar vein, the leadership of the new civilian 
police (PNC) - which had to train and equip 5,700 new recruits in two years 
with slight and insecure funding - was altered from parity to favouring the 
PN (11 posts) at the expense of the FMLN (six), although the left accepted 
this under protest. Those veterans of both sides who were not incorporated 
into the police or reformed army were entitled to benefit from the distribution 
of land, which, as in Nicaragua, is evidently a necessary (if insufficient) 
resource for the disarming of large forces in a rural society. Yet this process 
too, whilst better administered and more advanced than in Nicaragua, 
proceeded very slowly: by September 1993 only 1,024 of the 22,000 veterans 
assigned rights had benefited, and landlords were denouncing invasions of 
property and direct action in a manner depressingly reminiscent of the 
1970s.14 Greater success was registered in the much less taxing tasks of 
amending the constitution to remove the military from responsibility for 
internal order, drafting a Basic Law of National Defence, and forming a new 
civil-military academic council responsible for the curriculum, staffing and 
intake of the military academy.15 Similarly, the army's commitment to 
adjust its arsenal to the revised needs of a national defence was a necessarily 
far more extended and negotiable process than the surrender of powerful 
automatic weapons by the GN, PH and PN. 
Undoubtedly, the most publicised, controversial and even dangerous aspect 
of the Salvadorean demilitarisation experience lay in the provisions for 
investigation of human rights violations and the purge of military personnel 
over which the FMLN had remained insistent when negotiating in 1991 and 
which were represented in the reports of the Ad Hoc Commission (delivered 
23 September 1992) and the Truth Commission (published 15 March 1993). 
The Ad Hoc Commission only began work in mid-May 1992, and even 
though its work was extended for a month beyond the original schedule, it 
managed a detailed review of the records of only 232 senior members of the 
officer corps.16 Of these its confidential report recommended the removal 
(or in a very few cases, reassignment) of 102 men, including all but two of 
the army's five generals and all its full colonels. This effectively purged the 
existing high command led by General Rene Emilio Ponce and thus created 
a political crisis, out of which Cristiani sought to escape by delaying the 
implementation and disguising the form of the officers' removal. It was only 
in June 1993 that the high command was replaced - by a group from the 38th 
tanda headed by the pugnacious Colonel Humberto Corado Figueroa - and 
even at the end of 1993 at least eight affected officers were still formally in 
post. All those identified by the Commission retained their residual rights 
upon retirement. 
The report of the internationally staffed Truth Commission created even 
more bitterness because its detailed findings were made public. The 
Commission consulted 2,000 direct sources on 7,000 victims and indirect 
information on another 20,000 of the 75,000 people adjudged to have been 
killed since 1980. It paid particular attention to the massacres of 1980-83 and 
the internationally famous killings of priests, nuns and lay workers. In 
addition to finding state forces responsible for 85 % of the total death toll, the 
Commission, which had an observer on the Ad Hoc Commission, named 40 
officers - all bar a handful in the high command - that it recommended 
removed from the armed forces. This step distinguished the Truth 
Commission from that led by Judge Rettig in Chile, where direct assignation 
of responsibility had been scrupulously avoided despite the prior existence of 
an amnesty applicable to most of the crimes covered. No such amnesty had 
been introduced in El Salvador, but once the detail and directness of the 
Commission's report was apparent, the government moved immediately to 
introduce one - although this also benefited 15 FMLN commanders deemed 
responsible for the execution of 11 mayors (rebel forces being identified as 
causing 400 deaths and 200 disappearances).17 
The amnesty caused widespread outcry - even the dismay of the US 
government - but its apparent restoration of impunity received some tacit 
support from the FMLN, most notably ERP leader Joaquin Villalobos (one 
of the commanders named by the Truth Commission), who had vigorously 
defended the confidentiality of the Ad Hoc Commission's report and had 
earlier been identified as favouring an improved land deal for ex-guerrillas 
in return for allowing Cristiani to implement the purge in a graduated (and 
possibly partial) manner.18 Here the logic of the ex-guerrilla command was 
less transparent than in the case of the arms caches since the question of 
human rights and a purge of the military had been at the heart of their 
demands from January 1980. The issue is still cloudy, and many sympathetic 
to the FMLN, such as those at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA), 
found this position incoherent in its inconsistency. This may reflect the very 
specific divisions of the Salvadorean leadership or it might be an expression 
of a broader pattern of changing priorities as the position of erstwhile 
antagonists alters with the implementation of the peace settlements. (Some 
parallels with the activities of the Nicaraguan EPS in 1993 might well be 
drawn). In all events, the outcome was that the issue of war crimes and a 
military purge caused far less institutional crisis than public outcry during 
1993. This, together with the continued high-profile of ONUSAL, surely 
fortified the transition in the short-term. Yet doubts must remain as to the 
medium-range consequences in a society where vigilante violence had 
become firmly rooted. 
Equally, the election of a government less sympathetic to the officer corps 
than was ARENA under Cristiani could readily complicate - if not reverse 
- the amnesty concordat, as might also a new Supreme Court ruling on 
specific eligibility or constitutional propriety.19 These, though, should be 
considered matters of 'consolidation', being problems that would not even 
have arisen had there not already been demilitarisation - as in Guatemala -
or if there was - as in Nicaragua - such an erosion in institutionality that 
direct action ('justice') continues to compete with law. In these respects the 
Salvadorean experience is both more advanced and more secure. 
Nicaragua 
Since the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in February 1990, Nicaragua has 
undergone a process of extensive demilitarisation, of both government and 
insurgent forces, quite without precedent in the region. However, whilst 
stability has been largely maintained throughout, the composition of the 
military and the extent of its functions continues to be highly contested both 
within and beyond Nicaragua's borders. The end of the Nicaraguan civil war 
(which had claimed some 50,000 lives since 1979) was a result of regional 
negotiations (Esquipulas), substantive changes in the position of the FSLN 
and - under the Bush administration - a shift in US policy from backing a 
military option to support for a political settlement, albeit one conditioned by 
the continued existence of the contra rebels. The contras themselves, who had 
proved manifestly incapable of winning the war and who remained 
exclusively dependent on the USA for funding, had relatively little say in the 
final outcome. Of equal importance in achieving apolitical settlement to the 
conflict was the considerable skill demonstrated by the FSLN in negotiating 
within the parameters laid down at Esquipulas. In the area which concerns us 
here, it is of fundamental relevance that no formal negotiated settlement 
between the Ejercito Popular Sandinista (EPS) and the contras ever took 
place. The extensive reduction of EPS forces which has occurred since 1990 
rests largely on the Transition Accords reached between the executive of 
President Violeta Chamorro and the FSLN immediately after the February 
1990 election. 
Following the Sandinista victory in July 1979, the Somocista Guardia 
Nacional (GN) dissolved and its remaining members either surrendered or 
went into exile. Ex-GN members, notorious for their abuse of human rights, 
took no part in the new revolutionary army, which was composed exclusively 
of guerrilla troops. From an estimated 5,000 at the time of the overthrow, the 
EPS expanded rapidly to approximately 18,000 in the first months after the 
revolutionary triumph.20 The FSLN had drawn a number of lessons from the 
1973 overthrow of Unidad Popular in Chile and its leaders, anticipating a US 
backlash, were determined from the outset that the new military would be 
loyal to the revolutionary government. Contra operations began by the end 
of 1981, after which the rebel force grew from approximately 500 combatants 
to some 15,000 at the height of the conflict in 1985-1986. Fears of a possible 
US invasion also increased after US troops were sent to Grenada in 1983. 
The FSLN's response was vastly to increase the country's defensive 
capability: in 1983 a national draft was introduced and regular EPS troops 
grew from 24,000 in 1981 to some 75,000 by 1986.21 
Although the 1979-1990 regime became highly militarised in response to 
the external threat, the EPS remained subordinate to the ruling Sandinista 
Direction Nacional (DN) and was directly controlled by the Ministry of 
Defence. The Policia Sandinista (PS) and the state security forces came under 
the purview of the Ministry of Interior, and the Sandinista Popular Militias 
(MPS) were controlled by both ministries acting in tandem22 Although the 
PS was a civilian force, there was no clear division between police and 
military functions. After 1979, the security apparatus was developed not only 
to perform normal peacetime functions of the maintenance of domestic order, 
but also to guard against counterrevolutionary activity from within and 
beyond Nicaragua's borders. However, in contrast to other Central American 
countries, police activities remained under the supreme control of the 
executive (Direction National), rather than operating as an autonomous fuero 
of the armed forces. 
The Nicaraguan civil war was the most 'international' in character of those 
under consideration here, the insurgent forces funded by Washington and the 
conflict itself affecting the civil-military balance throughout the entire region. 
The peace settlement was also, by necessity, more dependent on external than 
domestic factors. The main thrust of the Esquipulas Accords signed by the 
Central American presidents on 7 August 1987 was to demobilise the contras. 
After initial rejection of the Arias plan, the Sandinista government signalled 
its willingness to compromise on the question of the internal political reforms 
stressed in the accords in exchange for an end to support by neighbouring 
states for insurgent forces and their backing for the plan agreed at Tela on 7 
August 1989, which provided for voluntary demobilisation, repatriation and 
relocation of the contras by the end of the year and the moving forward of the 
Nicaraguan elections to February 1990. 
By 1989, the contras looked like a spent force; support in the US Congress 
had eroded considerably since the Iran-Contra scandal became public in 1986 
and in 1988 the blocking by Congress of $36 million aid precipitated the first 
direct talks between the insurgent leadership and the FSLN at Sapoa in 
1988.23 In March 1989, US Secretary of State Baker brokered a bipartisan 
agreement on Central America, securing $49 million in 'humanitarian' aid 
for the contras but prohibiting further military assistance. This was 
recognition of the fact that Congress would no longer support the military 
option in Nicaragua, and the Baker team brought considerable behind-the-
scenes pressure to bear on the rebel leadership to return to Nicaragua and 
take part in the forthcoming elections.24 
External brokerage of the peace settlement in Nicaragua was only 
paralleled in the region by events in El Salvador. In the transition period 
responsibility for the contras' demobilisation was allocated to a joint 
Organisation of American States (OAS)-UN force, the International 
Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV); a UN force, ONUCA, was 
responsible for ensuring that rebel weapons were turned in and that sufficient 
guarantees of security were extended to those demobilised; in addition, 
ONUVEN (UN Observer Force for the Verification of the Nicaraguan 
Elections) was appointed to oversee the February 1990 poll. 
The issue of the EPS moved centre-stage after the UNO's electoral victory. 
President Chamorro herself consistently advocated values of reconciliation 
and compromise (a broad political amnesty was passed on 25 April), and 
stressed the need for demilitarisation. Stability has rested essentially on the 
consensus achieved between Chamorro, Minister of the Presidency Antonio 
Lacayo, and the FSLN leadership. The Transition Accords, signed a week 
before Chamorro's inauguration, signalled both recognition by the new 
regime that some degree of continuity was necessary for the preservation of 
order and acceptance by the FSLN that reform of the military was vital to 
guaranteeing the post-election peace. Resisting calls by the UNO far-right for 
a wholesale purge, the agreement protected the existing privileges and rank 
of Sandinista officers serving in the EPS, guaranteed the integrity and 
professionalism of the armed forces and also reaffirmed Chamorro's 
constitutional role as Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces (a feature not 
without considerable symbolic importance at the time). In June 1990 it was 
announced that a 50% reduction of the armed forces would take place within 
one year (from some 82,000 to 41,000), although these were to be principally 
drawn from the ranks of draftees and the popular militia, leaving the 
professional army largely intact.25 The Sandinista leadership had already 
accepted the need for a reduction in the armed forces prior to their electoral 
defeat, mainly in response to the reduced contra threat and the economic 
crisis which gripped the country by 1988.26 The EPS budget declined from 
$104 million in 1990, to $71 million in 1991, $42.9 million in 1992 and 
$36.5 million in 1993.27 
The incoming administration had made it clear that Sandinista officers 
would not be replaced by ex-members of the GN or the contras, a move 
which would have been totally unacceptable to the EPS, the FSLN leadership 
and the vast majority of the Sandinista rank-and-file. A number of reforms 
were subsequently implemented: the military draft, previously suspended in 
the run-up to the elections, was abolished and both the Ministry of the 
Interior and the Sandinista state security apparatus was disbanded. President 
Chamorro subsequently assumed the post of Defence Minister, but retained 
Sandinista General Humberto Ortega as Head of the Armed Forces. The 
failure to remove Ortega was loudly denounced by the far-right of the UNO 
coalition, led by Vice-President Virgilio Godoy, and echoed in the US Senate 
by Jesse Helms. The contra leaders, themselves excluded from a transition 
agreement which they saw as sanctioning continued Sandinista control over 
the armed forces, joined Godoy in calling for Ortega's removal. 
The Godoy faction also made persistent calls for reform of the police. 
Following the elections, about half of the Policia Sandinista (PS) had left the 
force, a result of both ideological disenchantment and notoriously low levels 
of pay. The vacuum was subsequently filled principally by ex-contra 
members, a fact which perhaps partly explains the unprecedented levels of 
force used to break up demonstrations of striking workers in Grenada in 
October 1991. Some limited reorganisation of the PS took place in 1990, such 
as the changing of the name to the less partisan Policia Nacional (PN). 
However, the existing command structure - as in the case of the EPS - was 
guaranteed by the Transition Protocol and continued to be staffed by 
Sandinista sympathisers. Controversy first surfaced in November 1991, when 
Interior Minister Carlos Hurtado declared a plan for creation of a municipal 
police force, envisaging a contingent of some 6,000 funded from local taxes 
and under the direct orders of mayors. Given that the most ultramontane 
elements of UNO - such as the mayor of Managua, Arnoldo Aleman - had 
their political stronghold in the municipalities and had long since demanded 
the transfer of police control to local government, the proposal increased 
FSLN fears of the creation of anti-Sandinista paramilitary forces. FSLN 
leader Daniel Ortega denounced the plan as unconstitutional and threatened 
to rearm the popular militias if the proposals were passed.28 Hurtado was 
forced to resign in April 1992 as a result of differences with Lacayo and the 
proposed changes were never implemented. However, several members of 
the contra 'Commanders Council' were appointed to leadership positions 
within the PN, particularly in their traditional strongholds in the northern 
region.29 Even this proved insufficient to meet Washington's demands for 
reform, and in July 1992 $116 million in US aid was frozen in protest at the 
Chamorro government's failure to restructure the security forces and the 
EPS. Chamorro subsequently announced the 'departmentalisation' of the 
police, which effectively gave control to the mayors and removed it from the 
regional police headquarters (run by Sandinista officials). Plans for a new 
police academy were also announced.30 Further insistence by US Secretary 
of State James Baker led to the removal in August 1992 of Sandinista police 
chief Rene Vivas, along with twelve other high ranking Sandinista police 
commanders, before the $116 million was finally unfrozen, demonstrating 
that, even without the contras, US influence remained considerable - a fact 
due in no small measure to the parlous state of the Nicaraguan economy. 
Vivas was subsequently replaced by Fernando Caldera Azmitia, also a 
Sandinista. However, the simultaneous creation of the post of Vice-Minister 
of Government with special responsibility for police affairs (filled by Antonio 
Aviles Iglesias, a cattle-rancher and former contra collaborator) effectively 
marked the placing of police affairs under civilian control, a measure which 
elicited considerably less enthusiasm on the part of the Nicaraguan left than 
amongst their Salvadorean or Honduran counter-parts, indicating the marked 
absence of any regional 'transition prototype' for establishing the formal 
division of powers. 
Despite ongoing conflicts over political control of the EPS and PN, 
remarkable progress in demobilisation has been achieved since February 
1990. The EPS was cut to 28,000 by 1991 and stood at some 15,200 by early 
1993, a reduction of approximately 75% against 1985 levels31 Perhaps even 
more impressive has been the reintegration of some 30,000 contra troops, 
particularly given the violence and bitterness of the civil war and the large 
numbers of civilian casualties it entailed. On 19 May 1990, a formal 
agreement was reached between the outgoing Sandinista government, the 
incoming Chamorro administration and the contra leadership (represented by 
Oscar Sovalbarro, 'Comandante Ruben') which pledged special assistance 
and development projects in return for demobilisation by the end of June. 
The demobilisation and reintegration, supervised by the CIAV, allowed the 
rebels to move into designated 'security zones' within Nicaragua prior to 
giving up their arms. Despite slow progress -many weapons handed in were 
old and rusty, indicating that a substantial portion of the contra's armaments 
had been salted away in hidden buzones - the vast bulk of the insurgent forces 
were successfully demobilised. 
However, demobilisation was accompanied by a general increase in 
violence and banditry, a situation resulting in no small measure from the fact 
that a substantial sector of the Nicaraguan population either possessed or 
retained direct access to automatic weapons.32 From 1991 onwards, some 
embittered elements of the contras reacted with violence to the government's 
failure to deliver on promises to provide land and credit, particularly in the 
north of the country.33 In a parallel move, after 1990 a limited number of 
demobilised EPS members ('recompas') also resorted to arms to press their 
demands for land, credit and severance payment. Recontra and recompa 
activity increased throughout 1993, and in the first six months of the year 
over 300 were killed in clashes between the EPS and the recontra.34 In July 
1993, recompa troops under the command of ex-EPS major, Victor Manuel 
Gallegos ('Pedrito el Hondurefio') occupied the northern town of Esteli. The 
EPS proceeded to reimpose order by force, including resort to aerial 
bombardment; this course of action elicited widespread condemnation from 
the Sandinista rank-and-file, but it was significant in signalling the loyalty of 
the EPS to the Chamorro executive and consolidating their status as the 
national army of defence. The use of force in Esteli - where approximately 
forty people, including civilians, were killed - contrasts with the army's 
reaction to the July 1990 national strike called by the Sandinista Frente 
Nacional de Trabaj adores (FNT), when the EPS eventually intervened to 
restore order but restrained from using direct force against the strikers. 
Between November and December of 1993 the EPS launched an offensive in 
the northern and central departments of Matagalpa, Jinotega, Esteli and 
Nueva Segovia to guarantee the coffee harvest and to wipe out remaining 
recontra bands. Following bloody exchanges in January, a peace deal was 
signed on 25 February 1994 between the government, the EPS and the 
recontra Northern Front 3-80 (FN-380), the last remaining rebel band. This 
provides for demilitarisation of the northern region and the incorporation of 
demobilised FN 3-80 combatants into the ranks of the local police force35 
Whilst sporadic fighting continues to pose a threat to public order in some 
areas, demobilisation of rebel forces has largely been secured throughout 
most of the country. Isolated skirmishes do not significantly threaten either 
the post-1990 peace or the institutions of state. In this sense at least, conflict 
in Nicaragua appears to have shifted decisively from the military to the 
political arena.36 
The decision by Violeta Chamorro in September 1993 to remove General 
Humberto Ortega from the head of the EPS was largely in response to the tit-
for-tat kidnappings of August 1993.37 It was also the culmination of 
sustained pressure from the Godoy faction of UNO and the US far-right (led 
by Helms), the latter having successfully managed to withhold disbursement 
of $104 million in US economic aid since June 1992 in protest at the 
Chamorro government's tacit alliance with the FSLN.38 It should be noted 
that after the Esteli uprising in July 1993, many Sandinista supporters were 
also calling for the removal of General Ortega, who had previously outraged 
the rank-and-file by inviting the then head of the Honduran Armed Forces, 
General Cantarero Lopez, to Managua (August 1990) and presenting the 
Order of Camilo Ortega to US Embassy Defence Attache, Lt.Colonel Dennis 
Quinn (February 1992). Ortega was also criticised by the left for calling for 
access to US and Panamanian military academies for the training of EPS 
officers.39 However, this merely served to highlight the very real problem 
the absence of a national military academy continues to pose for the future 
formation of the Nicaraguan officer corps. General Ortega made it quite clear 
that he would only step down once the new law determined the length of his 
mandate, thus guaranteeing the institutional arrangements of the EPS. 
Respect for the existing promotions structure - which remained a sine qua 
non of the FSLN-Lacayo-Chamorro pact - make it highly probable that 
General Ortega (who has announced his interest in the 1996 FSLN 
presidential nomination) will be replaced by EPS Chief of Staff, Sandinista 
General Joaquin Cuadra. 
At present the EPS looks set successfully to negotiate the transition from 
revolutionary army to fully institutionalised army of national defence. The 
new statute governing the armed forces is expected to be introduced to the 
National Assembly in the first months of 1994 and, given recent defections 
from the hard-line UNO camp, will probably be passed.40 In addition to 
setting a date for General Ortega's retirement, the proposed law will address 
the question of officer training and also regulate the important question of 
military pensions by formalising the statutes governing the new Instituto de 
Prevision Militar. Officers had no pension scheme during the 1980s and since 
1990 had dealt with the problem in an ad hoc fashion by selling off Soviet 
tanks and helicopters on the international arms market (the Kremlin turned 
down an offer to buy back the weapons).41 However, although the 
Nicaraguan IPM is gaining in importance, the EPS lacks the economic muscle 
of its Honduran or Guatemalan counterparts, having failed to acquire any 
economic base during eleven years of Sandinista rule (although this may of 
course be subject to future change). 
Another feature which separates the EPS from other militaries in the region 
is its human rights record: systematic abuse of human rights was never a 
feature of the Nicaraguan military after 1979 and this continues to be the 
case, despite isolated cases of revenge killings by both government troops 
and recontra rebels. In this respect, reform of the armed forces in Nicaragua 
is a very different question from that in neighbouring states, where the heart 
of the peace settlement is concerned with issues of punishment for crimes 
against humanity and purging the armed forces and security apparatus of 
those responsible for the violation of human rights. The question of the 
internal political conditionality required for an effective peace settlement has 
in this sense been quite distinct in Nicaragua, economic rather than moral 
compensation constituting the critical variable. Although the possibility of a 
return to violent and widespread conflict in the event of a breakdown in the 
post-1990 accord between the FSLN and the centre-right elite cannot be ruled 
out, the increasing weakness of the UNO right-wing greatly improves the 
current prospects for further institutionalisation of the EPS. 
Honduras 
Civil war was absent in Honduras in the 1980s, the militarisation which 
occurred throughout the decade being more a consequence of the Reagan 
administration's covert war against Nicaragua than a response to the domestic 
insurgent challenge (which was negligible in both scale and impact). Given 
the weakness of the left, a negotiated settlement was neither a necessity nor 
a possibility. However, after an amnesty was decreed in 1990 the guerrilla 
renounced the armed struggle and most exiles have since returned.42 With 
the end of the contra war, US aid to the Honduran military was massively 
reduced and the US embassy, along with international lending agencies and 
the greater part of the Honduran private sector, was in the forefront of calls 
for a reduction in the size of the armed forces. The latter, to date, have 
steadily resisted such demands but some shrinkage looks increasingly 
inevitable as aid returns diminish. Since 1990, as a result of both domestic 
and US pressure, some tentative advances were made towards reforming the 
security forces and ending the long-standing tradition of military impunity. 
However, it remains to be seen to what extent the domestic body politic is 
willing or indeed able to reduce the power of the military. 
Institutionalisation of the Honduran armed forces took place after the 
Second World War. In 1954 the first Bilateral Military Assistance Treaty was 
signed with the US and to date US influence has predominated. In 1956 the 
military made their first foray into national politics, intervening to restore the 
Constitutional order after a particularly inept bid at continuismo by Vice-
president Lozano Diaz. The Constitution passed the following year by the 
interim military triunvirato granted the armed forces effective autonomy from 
the Executive, an autonomy which continues to the present day.43 The 
historically weak and divided nature of civilian elites in Honduras favoured 
consolidation of a central role for the armed forces in national political life. 
Following an anti-communist coup in 1963, the first institutionalised military 
government (led by General Lopez Arellano) was installed. After defeat in 
the 1969 war with El Salvador, a more reformist tendency within the army 
briefly gained the upper hand and the military administration which governed 
between 1972 and 1975 was characterised by a mixture of structural reforms 
(most notably land reform) and partially successful cooption of the popular 
movement. A transcendental change occurred in 1975, when decision-making 
within the armed forces changed from what had been essentially a form of 
personalised caudillo rule towards a more collegiate form embodied in 
COSUFFAA (Consejo Superior de las Fuerzas Armadas). However, military 
reformism in Honduras lacked both strategic vision and ideological 
coherence, and by 1978 had reached an advanced state of decomposition, 
being largely characterised by selective repression of the popular movement 
and increased corruption within the officer corps. Formal power was handed 
back to civilian government in 1981, Liberal Party candidate Roberto Suazo 
Cordova assuming the presidency. However, the transition to civilian rule in 
Honduras was accompanied by an unprecedented increase in the power of the 
armed forces. 
Honduras's transition to elected government coincided with the election of 
the Republicans to the White House, and the unprecedented military build-up 
which occurred during the early 1980s was primarily a consequence of the 
regional strategy developed by Washington. Between 1978 and 1982 US 
military aid to Honduras increased almost twenty-fold, whilst the armed 
forces doubled in size to some 23,000 troops (from a 1980 figure of 
11,000).44 In 1982 Honduras became the second largest recipient of US aid 
in Latin America (after El Salvador), the $31.3 million disbursed in that year 
almost equalling the $32.5 million received between 1946-1981 45 General 
Alvarez Martinez, Head of the Armed Forces between January 1982 and 
March 1984, developed close links both with Suazo Cordova and US 
ambassador John Negroponte and lent his full support to the covert war 
against the Sandinistas. The US base at Palmerola, Comayagua (built 1983) 
operated as the logistics centre for US army operations in the country and 
large-scale joint military manoeuvres involving thousands of US and 
Honduran troops continued to be held on a regular basis until 1991. After 
1981, Honduras was also host to the contras, a force which at its height came 
near to equalling the size of the Honduran military itself. 
By regional standards, human rights abuses in Honduras were relatively 
limited. However, the traumatic effect of the 'dirty war' of the early 1980s 
on the national psyche should not be underestimated. By 1980, an extensive 
counter-insurgency apparatus was already in place, including Battalion 3-16, 
a paramilitary group composed of operatives from the police force FUSEP 
(Fuerzas de Seguridad Publica), police intelligence section DNI 
(Departamento Nacional de Investigaciones), and the army. Selective 
assassinations of government opponents began in 1980, and after 1981 
Battalion 3-16 orchestrated a campaign of disappearances and assassinations 
targeting both the Honduran and Salvadorean left. Coordination with 
Guatemalan and Salvadorean military intelligence was stepped up, often to 
devastating effect.46 
The anti-communist zeal of Alvarez Martinez led him frequently to 
pressure for a full-scale military invasion of Nicaragua, a fact which created 
almost as much unease amongst his allies on Capitol Hill as it did amongst his 
fellow officers. Despite relatively successful attempts to cultivate support for 
the counter-insurgency amongst political and business sectors, Alvarez's 
belligerent line, combined with his increasingly wayward evangelical 
predilections and almost total marginalisation of the Consejo Superior de las 
Fuerzas Armadas (COSUFFAA), were eventually to lead to his removal in 
1984 by officers led by air force commander, Colonel Walter Lopez 
Reyes.47 This internal coup was prompted by Alvarez's attempts to reduce 
COSUFFAA from 52 to 21 members and to restrict its mandate. Under Lopez 
Reyes, COSUFFAA's former influence was restored. In this sense at least, 
Alvarez's autocratic, strong-man rule is best viewed as a 'blip' in the 
trajectory of a military command structure largely characterised by traditions 
of mando colectivo. A high degree of esprit de corps amongst the different 
graduating classes (promociones militares) has been a feature since the 1970s. 
In 1985 COSUFFAA forced the closure of the controversial Regional 
Military Training Centre (CREM), which had played host to thousands of 
Salvadorean troops since its establishment under US auspices in 1983, thus 
raising the hackles of local officers. Lopez Reyes was subsequently forced 
to resign, in 1987, by the hard-line General Humberto Regalado, whose 
alleged involvement in drug-trafficking later earned him the sanction of the 
USA. Discontent within COSUFFAA led to Regalado's replacement in late 
1989 by his preferred successor, General Arnulfo Cantarero Lopez. 
Cantarero, lacking a base of support within the army, maintained a tenuous 
hold on power and was unceremoniously replaced in February 1991 by 
General Alonso Discua Elvir, one of the most powerful officers of the sixth 
promotion. 
The Honduran armed forces comprises four branches: army, navy, air-
force and police (FUSEP). The army is by far the largest branch and in 1991 
numbered some 27,000 troops.48 The air-force, equipped by the US with F-5 
fighters in 1987, is the most powerful in Central America. The navy is very 
small (with less than a dozen patrol boats) but as drug-trafficking operations 
are extended in the region its importance is steadily increasing. The FUSEP 
has been controlled by the military since 1963, although it has its own 
organisational structure.49 FUSEP controls a number of security bodies 
including the traffic police, treasury police, counter-insurgency battalion 
(4Cobras') and the intelligence and investigation unit, the DNI, formed in 
1976. Figures for 1991 show the FUSEP had some 14,000 members, making 
it the second most important branch of the armed forces after the army.50 
Since the end of the contra war, the US has radically reduced its support 
to the Honduran military, annual aid falling from $77.4 million in 1984 to 
$16.2 million in 199251 In the face of the refusal of the high command to 
sanction a cut in troops, US ambassador Cresencio Arcos finally imposed a 
unilateral fait accompli by reducing military aid to a mere $2.7 million in 
1993.52 Domestic pressure for a reduction of the armed forces is also 
considerable, particularly given the extensive cuts imposed on other areas of 
national expenditure by the structural adjustment package introduced in 
1990.53 To date the armed forces continue to play the anti-communist card 
and have rejected all entreaties to reduce their size. The historical weakness 
of the domestic political parties mean they are singularly ill-placed to demand 
substantive concessions, although there is some evidence that their confidence 
and independence from the military sphere has grown in recent years. In 
1992 Congress failed to protest Discua Elvir's manoeuvres to extend his term 
and lent their seal of approval to an amendment to the armed forces law 
which permitted the General to remain in post for a second consecutive 
term.54 
Another factor militating against reduction in military influence is the 
substantial increase in their economic power over the past decade. In 
September 1991 the Instituto de Prevision Militar (IPM) bought the newly 
privatised state cement company, much to the displeasure of COHEP, the 
national private sector association.55 The IPM (established 1973), one of the 
ten largest business concerns in the country, also holds interests in banking, 
insurance, real estate, palm oil production, a radio station and a funeral 
parlour; the institution's 1992 profits were estimated at some $40 million. 
The division between public and private sphere is (as in Guatemala and El 
Salvador) considerably blurred, the armed forces maintaining responsibility 
for, inter alia, immigration, national cartographic activities and the postal 
service. The imminent privatisation of the military-run state 
telecommunications monopoly, HONDUTEL, is currently proving a source 
of conflict, with local capital interests locked in a battle to prevent the IPM 
acquiring a majority share. Less institutionalised economic interests were 
also extended in recent years: drug-trafficking operations by the military 
were already considerable under the regime of Policarpo Paz Garcia (1978-
1980) but multiplied during the period of the contras' presence in 
Honduras.56 
However, since 1991 a number of cases have focused both domestic and 
international attention on reducing the military's traditional immunity from 
prosecution for human rights abuse, constituting the most serious challenge 
to their power to date. Advances have been both gradual and cautious, but are 
nonetheless significant. The May 1991 killing of five campesinos involved in 
a land dispute in El Astillero, department of Atlantida, led to a considerable 
public outcry and repeated calls for the alleged intellectual author of the 
massacre, Colonel Galindo, to stand trial in a civilian court. The following 
month, the failure of a military tribunal to sentence Colonel Erick Sanchez 
for shooting and permanently paralysing a civilian in a bar-room brawl in 
Tegucigalpa elicited widespread condemnation of the use of the fuero militar 
to protect members of the armed forces guilty of crimes against civilians. 
Despite repeated calls from the media and the popular movement, the 
Supreme Court failed satisfactorily to resolve the issue of competing 
jurisdictions. However, it was the rape, murder and mutilation of school 
student Riccy Mabel Martinez in July 1991 and the sustained protest 
campaign this generated which finally provoked a change in traditional 
practice. In July 1993 the officers implicated, Colonel Angel Castillo 
Maradiaga and Sergeant Eusebio Llovares Funez, were sentenced to sixteen 
and ten years respectively. Intervention by the US embassy in the case was 
instrumental in securing the convictions: Ambassador Cresencio Arcos sent 
forensic samples to the USA for analysis by the FBI, signalling a growing 
impatience on the part of Washington with both the intransigence of the 
military and the manifest weakness of the local judiciary. 
Allegations of the use of torture had long been levelled at the DNI and 
FUSEP by local human rights groups and since 1990 certain procedural 
measures to improve police practice had been instigated with US support.57 
However, steps towards substantive reform of the security forces were made 
in 1993, following a spate of drug-related assassinations by the San Pedro 
Sula DNI. In March 1993 President Callejas, in an astute move to deflect 
rising criticism, set up an Ad Hoc Commission with the specific remit of 
drawing up reforms to the security forces and judicial system. The 
Commission recommended the formation of a civilian-controlled Public 
Ministry, to be responsible for the new DIC (Division de Investigaciones 
Criminales), to replace the scandal-ridden DNI. The military themselves 
appeared only too happy to be rid of the DNI, which had long since become 
a distinct liability. However, the DNI itself has passed through various 
permutations in its chequered history and a certain scepticism regarding the 
extent of the current reforms would appear justified. A point of particular 
concern is whether or not DNI officers accused of human rights abuse will 
be incorporated into the DIC. Although not explicitly recommended by the 
Ad Hoc Commission, the transfer of the FUSEP to civilian control looks 
certain to be an issue in 1994, Innovation and Unity Party representative 
Carlos Sosa Coello having tabled a bill to Congress in December 1993 to 
separate FUSEP from the military and create a civilian police force. The 
extent of the concessions the military will be forced to make remains unclear; 
although the Public Ministry statute was approved in December 1993 the high 
command continued to contest the proposed transfer of anti-narcotics 
operations to the new ministry. 
Another area where the military have recently come under considerable 
pressure is the question of human rights trials for the events of the early 
1980s. Despite the absence of civil war in Honduras, the question of war 
crimes has considerable resonance, precisely because of the traumatic impact 
of events of the early 1980s on a society historically accustomed to 
comparatively low levels of overt violence. More recently, the 
'demonstration effect' of the Salvadorean Truth Commission (published 
March 1993) should be noted. The long-standing call by local human rights 
organisations for a Truth Commission came to the fore when the disappeared 
became an issue in the 1993 election campaign. In an attempt to divert 
attention from what was proving to be a serious electoral disadvantage for PN 
presidential candidate Oswaldo Ramos Soto (signalled by human rights 
groups for his involvement in forced disappearances), President Callejas 
appointed the Human Rights Ombudsman, Dr Leo Valladares, to carry out 
an investigation. The final report, published on 29 December 1993, proved 
something of a bomb-shell, constituting the first official acknowledgement of 
the hundred-and-fifty-plus disappearances which occurred during the 
1980s.58 The Commission led by Valladares gained unprecedented access to 
confidential files in the US State Department, revealing evidence of a 
systematic campaign of human rights abuse by the armed forces and details 
of the involvement of US and Argentine officers in training both the 
Honduran military and the contra in kidnapping and torture techniques. 
Battalion 3-16 was found to be still active, despite claims by the high 
command in 1987 that it had been disbanded. The report named a number of 
high-ranking officers implicated in the disappearances, including Generals 
Regalado Hernandez, Walter Lopez Reyes and Discua Elvir, and 
recommended that they stand trial.59 
At present the military maintain that the 1991 Amnesty Law protects them 
from prosecution. However, public pressure on the new Liberal Party 
administration of Dr Carlos Roberto Reina (inaugurated 27 January 1994) to 
pursue prosecutions is considerable. One might speculate that a limited 
number of punitive trials would not be looked on unfavourably by the USA, 
anxious to clip the wings of the recalcitrant Honduran military.60 More 
problematic would be securing the neutrality of the majority of the officer 
corps. In one sense, the collegiate style of the high command might lend itself 
to the eventual sacrifice of a handful of officers, at least in the form of a 
limited internal purge if not through the domestic courts.61 However, the 
pound of flesh which would inevitably be extracted in return may prove more 
than the Reina administration is currently willing or able to provide. 
Although the current conjuncture has the armed forces on the defensive, a 
tendency sharpened by the current campaign to abolish compulsory 
conscription, the leverage of the civilian authorities remains decidedly 
limited. It would appear, however, that the gradual pace of reform may yet 
deliver durable results and contribute to a lasting shift in the civil-military 
balance in Honduras. 
Panama 
The nature of the modern military - and therefore of the 'military question' 
-in Panama is quite different to that in the rest of the region. In fact, the 
military, known as the Panamanian Defence Force (FDP), was formally 
abolished on 12 February 1990 following the US invasion of 20 December 
1989. However, this core element of a most insecure 'imposition of 
democracy' by force was not subsequently consolidated.62 In the first place 
this was because the de facto abolition of the FDP only gave way to a 
profusion of not dissimilar police and paramilitary bodies. Perhaps more 
important, though, was the result of the referendum of 15 November 1992 on 
reforms to the 1983 Constitution, when 64 percent of the voters rejected the 
proposal that, 'the Republic of Panama shall have no army' along with 57 
other (less publicised and controversial) proposed amendments. It is 
undoubtedly the case that this result reflected the genuine unpopularity of the 
Endara regime. Nonetheless, the opposition Frente Nacional Pro-
Constituyente (FRENO), led in this respect by the erstwhile pro-Noriega 
Partido Revolucionario Democratico (PRD), clearly exploited rising 
nationalist sentiment after the invasion and gave it an acutely practical 
application by questioning how it would be possible for Panama without a 
military force to assume its obligations to defend the Canal from the year 
2000 under Article V of the 1977 Treaty.63 Indeed it is a reflection not just 
of the political position after December 1989, but also of the anomaly at the 
heart of Panama's existence since 1903 that the PRD should attract significant 
support for its own anti-militarist formulation that included US forces: 'There 
shall be no army in the Republic of Panama' 
The abolition of the FDP in 1990 was the second time that the USA had 
disbanded the armed forces of Panama, the first occasion being under the 
1904 Taft Agreement when Washington backed the Conservative president 
Amador, killed off the development of a regular army and set up a notionally 
non-partisan police force. This service was institutionally weaker and more 
lacking in ideological foundation than the 'constabulary forces' established 
in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua by Washington in the 
same period (although over time a comparable praetorianism did develop).65 
Between 1903 (Bunau-Varilla-Hay Accord) and 1936 (General Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation) US forces were deployed in Panamanian 
territory nine times, consonant with the Republic's effective protectorate 
status and Washington's administrative disposition up to the 'Good 
Neighbour' policy. However, in addition to the presence of US troops in the 
Canal Zone - where Panamanian sovereignty was so theoretical as to exclude 
the flying of the national flag until 1959 - Washington's interference went as 
far as the confiscation of all the rifles held by the police in 1916, a move that 
many held responsible for the ease with which Costa Rican forces were able 
to occupy and hold disputed territory in February 1921.66 After the 1936 
Treaty, which revoked Washington's formal right to intervene, the police was 
gradually expanded (to 2,000) and, during World War Two, again provided 
with some armament beyond hand-guns. A basic training school was 
established in 1948 under the command of Colonel Jose Antonio Remon; the 
Guardia Nacional (GN) was only established in 1953, after Remon had 
become president through a mix of populist rhetoric and aggressive 
exploitation of the spoils system (particularly around the Colon Free Trade 
Zone) that was later to be developed by Torrijos and Noriega. 
The GN, like its namesake in Nicaragua, was not strictly an army, and 
most of its 6,000 (predominantly black and mestizo) members at the time of 
the 1968 coup were effectively police officers. On the other hand, by the end 
of the 1960s almost half of the GN's enlistment had received training at the 
US School of the Americas (where they accounted for one-ninth of all pupils 
up to the School's closure in October 1984), and the officer corps were sent 
to regular military academies abroad, including Mexico and Peru where there 
was an institutional ethos discernably at variance with the Pentagon model. 
It is notable that the GN lacked the repressive trajectory of its Nicaraguan 
counterpart, had no need to engage in serious counter-insurgency operations 
(even after 1968), and was restricted to barracks during the 1964 riots over 
the Canal Zone when 18 students were killed. 
The coup of October 1968 - initially provoked by Arnulfo Arias's attempt 
upon entering office to remove the Presidential Guard from GN control -
changed this position appreciably, not least by opening the country's first real 
experience of military government. Over the following decade the GN's 
enlistment rose to 15,000, its absolute budget rose tenfold, and under the 
fiercely corporatist 1972 Constitution (which continues to provide the basis 
for subsequent amendments) it became the country's leading political 
institution and acquired administrative functions which further expanded its 
management of patronage, contraband and a swathe of semi-licit enterprise. 
The fact that political parties were banned for a full decade (1968-78) and 
that the assemblies elected under the 1972 Constitution were explicitly 
limited to rubber-stamping decisions made by Torrijos and the high command 
confirm the GN's authoritarian pedigree.67 Equally - rather as in Honduras, 
but within the more consequential context of the Canal negotiations - it was 
pressure from the Carter administration which eventually secured a modicum 
of political competition and formal democratic administration. (This process 
was quite distended, lasting from the first set of constitutional amendments 
in 1978 to the 1984 elections, but Torrijos's death in 1981 played an 
important part in causing such a delay at a particularly charged moment in 
regional politics). However, the GN's direct assumption of power during the 
1970s was unusual in its form and rationale, and this only fell into line with 
local traditions of military-backed 'officialise parties after 1984 (and even 
then the PRD, formed in 1978 on the eve of the Nicaraguan Revolution, is 
not usefully seen in the same light as the Guatemalan Partido Institucional 
Democratico or the Salvadorean Partido de Conciliation Nacional). Equally, 
proper recognition should be given to the scope for restricting and violating 
human rights: whilst the GN was indisputably authoritarian and 
systematically corrupt, it killed very few people, arresting, abusing and 
exiling numbers on a scale quite comparable with elected regimes elsewhere 
in Latin America. (Within Central America, its abuse of authority was closer 
to the levels witnessed in Costa Rica than Honduras, at least in the early 
1980s). 
At the same time, the circumscription of democratic rights was matched by 
an expansion of some social liberties (the 1972 Labour Code), public 
expenditure and public employment (rising from 51,998 in 1971 to 107,000 
in 1980, or from 13 to 25 per cent of the total labour force).68 It is certainly 
the case that this high-spending and redistributionist trend was funded first 
(1971-82) by a markedly cavalier fiscal policy - Panama has one of the 
highest debts per capita in the world - and then (1983-89) by reliance upon 
taxing, laundering and occasionally directly generating cocaine revenues. 
Neither phase, then, possessed much greater 'substantive democracy' than 
that of a procedural character. Yet both assuredly militated to the benefits of 
sectors of the country's poor as well as giving the regime a critical quota of 
autonomy from the USA at a time when its political and military influence 
was directly focused on the isthmus.69 
Although the democratising reforms to 150 of the Constitution's 275 
articles were approved in April 1983, the GN was transformed into the 
Fuerzas de Defensa de Panama (FDP) under a separate law hurriedly enacted 
in October of that year. It thereby acquired a much more traditional military 
aspect with a very small air-force and coastguard, the immunity of its 
commanding officer from presidential removal (a matter forgotten by 
President Delvalle when he tried to oust Noriega in February 1988), and, 
under Ley 20 designed to prepare it for defence of the Canal, direct 
responsibility for the country's ports and the (highly profitable) control of 
migration. It was at this juncture that Noriega (previously Chief of 
Intelligence and then Chief of Staff) took overall command. As a result, one 
should identify the quality of individual leadership as well as institutional 
expansion as a factor in an enhanced regional profile (sponsorship of 
Contadora; controversial ambivalence towards the Sandinistas), increased 
(and justified) civilian apprehension that the new FDP was seeking to deepen 
its political domination, and the increased role given to intelligence and 
specialist elites by the military.70 
Noriega's early period of power was marked by the electoral fraud of 1984 
and the infamous murder of radical oppositionist Hugo Spadafora (for which 
seven of the ten FDP members later charged were acquitted in September 
1993). However, it was really only from 1987 that the FDP resorted to 
aggressively partisan intervention in politics, and this generated internal 
division with dangerous coup attempts in 1988 and 1989. Noriega's reliance 
upon populist mobilisation and anti-US rhetoric might be viewed as a renewal 
of the torrijista heritage - certainly sections of the PRD saw it thus - but 
there is a more convincing interpretation of the rabble-rousing and fixing of 
the 1989 poll in the antics of a desperate caudillo against whom neither the 
FDP's structures (which did not include the 'Dignity Battalions') nor US 
ineptitude nor the divisions of the domestic opposition provided short-term 
guarantees. By concentrating on the first of these the post-invasion 
management of civil-military relations has proved to be lop-sided, superficial 
and probably self-defeating in its evasion of the long and short-term 
dilemmas inherent in the nature of the Panamanian state. 
The 1989 invasion was almost immediately successful, obviating the need 
even for formal surrender arrangements, let alone any negotiated political 
settlement. Aside from Noriega himself, who was removed to US jurisdiction 
on 4 January 1990, there were two broad prejudiced parties: the civilian and 
military supporters of the regime who were detained or persecuted by the 
invasion forces, and those citizens who were killed, injured or lost their 
property in the less than precise bombing and fire-control of the US troops. 
This latter group had the formal backing of the Endara regime for its 
compensation claim against the US government. This was eventually filed on 
behalf of 286 named victims at the end of 1993 even though the US Supreme 
Court had already rejected the Panamanian government's claim for some 
$400 million in reparations, largely for local enterprise.71 On the other 
hand, the Endara government itself refused for over four years to concede an 
amnesty that might free around 60 Noriega supporters, allow 40 to return 
from exile, and drop charges against 800.72 The PRD predictably led the 
campaign for such a move, which was also backed by the organisations of 
those injured by the invasion, but the government no less predictably refused 
to issue an amnesty on the grounds that this would benefit many who were 
guilty of torture, fraud and murder, especially in the suppression of the 1988 
and 1989 coup attempts.73 
The difficulty with the government's position was that soon after the 
invasion it was re-employing hundreds of FDP personnel, including senior 
members of its anti-terrorist and intelligence branches, to serve in the new 
security apparatus. This burgeoning institutional network was founded on the 
Fuerza Publica (FP), which in three years came to number 11,650, including 
11,000 in the Policia Nacional (PN), 300 in the National Maritime Service 
and 350 in the National Air Service.74 Whilst the budget for these forces was 
under strict civilian control, and they possessed no proper military equipment 
or formal mission, their size approximated to that of the FDP, ex-members 
of which comprised at least 6,000 of the total enlistment. Subsequently, the 
government, asserting (controversially and without tangible evidence) that it 
was the target of several coup attempts, created three further forces: the 
investigative Policia Tecnica Judicial (PTJ), under the authority of the 
Controlaria, the 500-strong Servicio de Protection Institucional (SPI) 
intelligence service, and the Tactical Weapons Unit, equipped with automatic 
weaponry and staffed by specially trained members of the PN, PTJ and 
SPI.75 Indeed, Panama witnessed a veritable renaissance of paramilitary 
activity after 1990 with the creation of a Municipal Police in the capital and 
the existence of some 200 security firms employing 12,000 guards.76 It can 
be argued that the frequently changing leaderships of some of these state 
forces (notably the PN and the PTJ) contributed to rather than curbed 
lawlessness, and only the FP was clearly subject to legislative oversight and 
authority.77 Meanwhile, some 6,000 of the 9,000-strong US garrison in the 
Canal Zone were almost constantly engaged in a series of 'manoeuvres' 
known as 'Strong Roads' and largely dedicated to road-building and 
developing the new military installations at Veraguas. Their activities helped 
to sustain the campaign, led by Canal Zone workers, for renegotiation of the 
1977 Treaties and a prolonged US military presence. Yet only once, in 
December 1990, did Endara rely directly on foreign troops to resolve a 
domestic crisis - when PN officers occupied their HQ in demand for 
improved conditions, and the president, claiming that this was a coup 
attempt, persuaded the SouthCom commander to surround the building with 
500 soldiers and break up the protest.78 It was this event that prompted 
Endara's creation of the new police forces, but his nationalist identity was 
already sufficiently tarnished that the matter failed to develop into a major 
crisis. 
Very few of the developments noted above assisted the settlement of civil 
tension, so sharply evident in the high crime rates, or the political impasse 
expressed by the failure of Endara and the USA to secure constitutional 
reform as well as by the impressive resilience of the PRD. Under no 
circumstances can they be argued to have reduced the level of the drug-trade, 
about which Washington continues to be seriously concerned. A sober 
appraisal of the post-invasion position could, then, stress the continuation of 
a paramilitary elite in a new institutional guise, the notable failure to reach 
a codified arrangement for the country's security forces, the absence of an 
amnesty or any formal negotiation with the quite numerous servants and 
supporters of the old regime, and the continued corrosive effects of 
narcotrafico. Against this, the maintenance of the electoral cycle, the evident 
capacity of Panamanian constitutions to withstand piecemeal reform, a still 
peaceable adaptability of the GN/FDP/FP continuum, and the absence of any 
guerrilla conflict before or after the transition could all be interpreted as 
bolstering the redistributive aspects of a notably 'grey' service sector and 
reducing the threat of political violence. Neither scenario, however, involves 
a qualitative 'demilitarisation' of Panama, within the Canal Zone or without 
it. 
Guatemala 
At present, demilitarisation of Guatemalan society seems a distant prospect. 
The nature of military control has undergone a profound transformation in the 
past decade: the counter-insurgency strategy developed after 1982 extended 
the influence of the armed forces into the lives of the rural population to an 
unprecedented extent. Partly in consequence, the division between civilian 
and military spheres in Guatemala - substantive and perceived - is blurred 
to a degree without parallel in the rest of the region. Peace negotiations with 
the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) insurgents have 
developed intermittently since 1987, but the central issue of human rights has 
to date proved an insurmountable block. It remains to be seen if the recent 
commitment by the URNG and the de Leon government to reach a peace 
agreement by the end of 1994 will bear fruit. Despite the transition to civilian 
rule in 1986, the military remain the final arbiter of national politics. 
Developments since 1988 indicate a resurgence in popular organisation after 
the widespread and generalised repression of the early 1980s. However, it 
remains doubtful whether either developments in 'civil society' or the 
negotiations themselves will be able fundamentally to alter the balance of 
civil/military power within the foreseeable future. 
The use of military force in Guatemala's civil war has been both more 
brutal in its impact and more transformative in its effect than elsewhere in the 
region. Ample documentation exists of the legacy of systematic human rights 
abuse by the armed forces, which reached its peak during the 1978-1983 
period. The campaign against the highland civilian population left over 
100,000 killed or 'disappeared' and over 1 million displaced.79 Following 
the scorched earth policies employed during the Lucas Garcia regime (1978-
1982), military strategy shifted to more sophisticated counter-insurgency 
policies aimed primarily at controlling the rural civilian population. 
Mechanisms included: mandatory participation in civil patrols (Patrullas de 
Autodefensa Civil, PACs); forced resettlement of the displaced rural 
population in camps or 'model villages', grouped together in army-controlled 
'development poles'; and inter-institutional coordinating councils which 
centralised administration of all development projects at every level of 
government under military command. All these institutions were legalised in 
the Constitution of 1985. 
It is generally agreed that the return to civilian rule in 1986 was part of a 
long-term military strategy begun under the regime of Mejia Victores (1983-
1986), intended to improve the country's international image and facilitate 
greater aid flows. Following elections for a constituent assembly in 1984, 
presidential and congressional elections were held in 1985. However, 
although formal political power was returned to the civilian administration 
of Vinicio Cerezo in 1986, military control of the rural population has 
remained non-negotiable in the transition. The limits of Cerezo's room for 
manoeuvre were evident from the outset of his administration. Prior to 
leaving office, the Mejia Victores regime had passed an amnesty law (DL 
No. 8-86) covering the period March 1982 to January 1986. Cerezo accepted 
this in the hope of obtaining at least some measure of neutrality from the bulk 
of the officer corps - the transition was underpinned by the understanding 
that there would be no prosecutions for human rights abuses.80 As Cerezo 
himself stated: 4 We are not going to be able to investigate the past. We would 
have to put the entire army in jail'.81 
By 1990, human rights violations were again mounting in response to 
renewed guerrilla activity and urban mobilisations protesting the worsening 
economic crisis. A disgruntled sector of hard-line military officers (the 
4Oficiales de la Montana'') supported by elements in the private sector 
federation Camara de Agricultura, Comercio, Industria y Finanza (CACIF) 
and the ultramontane Movimiento de Liberation Nacional (MLN) staged 
attempted coups in both 1988 and 1989, and only the firm support of Defence 
Minister General Gramajo maintained Cerezo's rule. However, for all his 
polished civilista discourse, Gramajo's primary concern lay with preserving 
military unity rather than shoring up the beleaguered civilian president. 
Following the subsequent accession of Serrano Elias to the presidency, a 
series of rapid changes occurred within the civilian political sphere (the 
abortive autogolpe in May 1993, the overthrow of Serrano and his eventual 
replacement by former human rights ombudsman, Ramiro de Leon Carpio). 
It is worth noting that the high command did not decisively back either 
Serrano or his ill-fated Minister of Defence, General Samayoa, in their 
autogolpista pretensions, nor did they intervene against de Leon after his 
sudden accession to the presidency. To this extent, the 'back to barracks' 
tendency within the army has been significantly consolidated, even if in 
practice retreat from the exercise of power remains formal rather than 
substantive. The lack of a civilian political project, combined with the 
manifest weakness and corruption of Guatemala's political parties, has only 
served further to underline the centrality of the armed forces in national 
politics. 
The distinction within the Guatemalan military between hard-liners, who 
favour a no-holds-barred military solution to the civil war, and those, 
currently in ascendance, who tend towards a negotiated solution, is often 
noted. However, such divisions are essentially fluid and their utility for 
analysing shifts within a military so steeped in a rigid and seemingly 
immutable culture of anti-communism remains debatable. Differences 
amongst the officer corps to date have essentially been about tactics rather 
than ideology. Nonetheless, limited advances should be recognised: there is 
now no military veto on the peace talks (as there was in 1987) and the 
possibility that a section of the officer corps is prepared to negotiate on 
substantive issues such as the abolition of the Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil 
should not be ruled out. 
Despite considerable advancement since the first formal talks held between 
the URNG insurgents and the government of Vinicio Cerezo (1986-1991) in 
1987, a negotiated end to the civil war in Guatemala remains far from 
imminent. Indeed, in the six years since the signing of the Esquipulas 
Accords, not even a partial cease-fire has been achieved. The Guatemalan 
military are notable both for their operational and ideological unity and for 
the almost total historical absence of a tradition of negotiation and 
compromise. No troop demobilisation has occurred to date and indeed troop 
numbers increased after the signing of the Esquipulas Accords in 1987: in 
1985, troops totalled 51,600 but had reached over 60,000 by 1991.82 Illegal 
conscription into the army continues to occur and, in addition, some 500,000 
or more individuals remain organised in the paramilitary PACs. The guerrilla 
challenge in Guatemala is far weaker than that of the FMLN in El Salvador 
and, unlike the contra in Nicaragua, has not relied significantly on any 
external sponsors capable of bringing pressure to bear in peace negotiations. 
Totalling between 1,000 and 2,000 armed combatants, the URNG's military 
activities in recent years singularly failed to shift the military balance 
sufficiently to affect substantially the terms of negotiations (as the 1989 
FMLN offensive did in El Salvador). The Guatemalan military see 
themselves as the victors in the civil war and many officers are particularly 
opposed to the granting of concessions at the negotiating table to an opponent 
who has proved unable to extract the same on the battlefield. 
The first meeting in October 1987 between the URNG and the Comision 
Nacional de Reconciliation (CNR) - the latter set up within the framework 
of the Esquipulas Accords and headed by Bishop of Esquipulas, Monsignor 
Rodolfo Quezada - was vetoed by the army after the series of proposals 
presented by the URNG proved unacceptable to the high command. The most 
obvious demands were for the abolition of the apparatus of counter-
insurgency - civil patrols, model villages and 'development poles'. However, 
it was the demands for establishment of a Truth Commission on past human 
rights abuses and the setting up of demilitarised zones which ultimately 
proved unacceptable to the officer corps. 
A significant shift in external factors had occurred by the time of the 
second meeting in Oslo in March 1990. In the aftermath of the Cold War and 
the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, the Bush administration began to push 
for a negotiated settlement in Guatemala. However, in contrast to El 
Salvador, US leverage against the Guatemalan military is minimal. Progress 
in the negotiations is consequently dependant on internal factors to a far 
greater extent than in the other countries examined here. The Guatemalan 
army has long prided itself on its independence, and its ability to secure 
alternative sources of aid - notably from Taiwan and Israel - during periods 
when US military aid was cut in protest at human rights violations has 
increased both its nationalist disposition and its operational autonomy. The 
amount of US military aid currently received by Guatemala is negligible.83, 
However, mounting economic difficulties may yet mean that finding favour 
with the USA is more important to the Guatemalan elite than in the past. 
Certainly a powerful sector of the domestic business elite anxious to profit 
from regional economic integration is currently in favour of a negotiated 
settlement. Such calculations inevitably continue to affect civil-military 
relations. It should be remembered, however, that the Guatemalan armed 
forces have gained a degree of economic influence commensurate with their 
political power, long presiding over the most extensive economic interests of 
all the Central American militaries. The armed forces owns the state 
electricity and telecommunications monopolies, along with the national 
airline, extensive ranching, banking, insurance and real estate interests and 
at least one national television channel (Canal 5). Additional economic 
muscle is provided by involvement in drugs-smuggling, this last a source of 
increasing concern to the USA. The US DEA estimated that in 1991 and 1992 
150 tonnes of cocaine passed through Guatemala annually.84 Unlike their 
Salvadorean counter-parts, the military in Guatemala are economically reliant 
neither on the domestic bourgeoisie nor on US aid. 
In contrast to the Reagan administration's failure to condemn human rights 
abuses during the 1980s, under Bush military aid was suspended in January 
1991 in protest at the lack of action regarding the notorious June 1990 murder 
of US citizen Michael Devine by soldiers in the Peten, the abduction, rape 
and torture of Ursuline nun, Dianna Ortiz, and the December 1990 massacre 
of fifteen villagers in Santiago Atitlan. Washington's tougher stance 
encouraged a renewal of negotiations and the first official round of talks in 
April 1991 in Mexico City established an eleven point agenda for negotiation. 
The second round at Queretaro the following June achieved agreement on the 
first (and least controversial) point around the definition of 'democratisation'. 
However, three subsequent meetings in September and October 1991 and 
January 1992 failed to reach agreement on the issue of human rights. For 
over a year the URNG insisted on a set of demands wholly unacceptable to 
the government negotiating team.85 
Issues surrounding a cease-fire, rebel demobilisation and reincorporation 
into civilian life also proved a constant block to negotiations, given the 
rebels' understandable fear of reprisals and the tendency of a significant part 
of the officers corps to see talks merely as a negotiated surrender by the 
URNG. A new insurgent proposal in May 1992 postponed debate of 
demobilisation issues, instead focusing on refugee resettlement, constitutional 
reform, indigenous rights and economic change. In August 1992 agreement 
was reached to freeze recruitment into the PACs. However, the army only 
gave this undertaking on condition that recruitment could recommence in the 
event of an insurgent offensive. Since 1990 the URNG have met with a 
number of national social and economic groups, including the private 
enterprise confederation CACIF, and the cumulative effect of such contacts 
on future development should not be underestimated, even if the rebels' 
demands have yielded few tangible results to date. 
Negotiations were at a virtual impasse throughout most of 1993; attention 
focused instead on the political crisis surrounding the May autogolpe and its 
immediate aftermath. Initial expectations that the de Leon administration 
might reach a rapid settlement with the URNG were soon disappointed when 
in October 1993 the hawkish Hector Rosada (who replaced Bishop Quezada 
as mediator in the talks), presented a new peace plan to the URNG which 
attempted to separate technical negotiations for a ceasefire from talks on 
social and political reform and offered neither concrete guarantees for human 
rights nor the possibility of a Truth Commission. This was immediately 
rejected by the URNG. The January 1994 agreement to restart peace talks 
signals an appreciable advance after the previous months of dead-lock, the 
URNG scoring a notable victory in the adoption of the 1991 Mexico Agenda 
as the basis for talks. This 11-point document includes substantive and 
operational aspects of a peace settlement, spanning the issues that gave rise 
to or have arisen from the war, and aspects relating to bringing about the end 
to the armed conflict.86 The role accorded to the UN as mediator in the 
negotiations (and in subsequent verification of any accord reached) must be 
seen as a positive step. The presence of UN Undersecretary Marrack 
Goulding at the recent talks to agree the agenda for talks indicates the 
prospect of an increasingly active intervention by the UN in this most 
obdurate of the Central American conflicts. 
The issue of human rights is at the heart of any future accord in Guatemala, 
which will almost inevitably be focused on securing certain basic guarantees 
for both ex-combatants and the civilian population rather than on significant 
troop demobilisation or restructuring of the armed forces, issues the high 
command has to date ruled off the negotiating agenda. However, although an 
agreement establishing formal guarantees for future observance of human 
rights may be eventually achieved, the military continue to unite in resisting 
the setting up of a Truth Commission to investigate past war crimes (a point 
insisted on by local human rights organisations). The lack of realistic 
prospects for any investigation into past abuses in Guatemala is symptomatic 
of the persistence of military power and a singular lack of interest on the part 
of civilian elites. Despite some moderate advances registered in recent years, 
such as the bringing to trial of some lower-ranking members of the armed 
forces and members of the civil patrols in cases of major abuse (Santiago 
Atitlan, the murder of sociologist Myrna Mack), the immunity of senior 
officers remains absolute and the military's counter-insurgency role 
unaltered.87 
Given the persistence of the civil war and the long-standing involvement 
of the police corps in counter-insurgency activities, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that little advance on the separation of military from police functions and the 
transfer of police control to civilian authorities has been made in Guatemala. 
Some attempts to reform the police occurred during the Cerezo 
administration. However, the central question of political control has never 
been addressed.88 Under Serrano, joint police-military operations were 
stepped up in an attempt to improve lacklustre police performance, through 
such mechanisms as the creation of a joint permanent patrolling operation, 
the 'Servicio de Protection Civil' (SIPROCI) which coordinated anti-
narcotics operations with the US DEA. In May 1991 Interior Minister 
Hurtado Prem announced the creation of a Civil Guard to unify the Treasury 
and National Police (to be trained by Chilean Carabineros). However, 
although the various police bodies are nominally under the jurisdiction of the 
Interior Ministry, they effectively remain under army control. In March 
1992, SIPROCI was replaced by 'Hunapa', ajoint force comprising army and 
Treasury Police members and commanded by a military officer, Col. Herman 
Grootewold.89 After Hunapa troops were implicated in the killing of one 
student and the disappearance of at least 15 others in April 1992, they were 
replaced in November 1992 with an Integrated Task Force (FTI), comprised 
of 2,200 agents from the Treasury Police, National Police and Military 
Ambulatory Police, and - like Hunapa - ultimately subject to military 
command. Since 1990, the extension of such 'anti-delinquency' bodies 
indicate an increase rather than a decrease in military control of the police. 
The recent decision to transfer police intelligence services to the office of the 
Presidency may signal a growing acceptance of certain 'professionalising 
reforms' by a sector of the military; however, the net effect of the recent 
transfer has yet to be seen and it should be noted that the military's own 
intelligence sector remains inviolate. 
Despite the absence to date of a formal settlement in Guatemala, a number 
of developments since 1987 indicate important shifts within what might 
rightly be called 'civil society', indicating that certain calculations are being 
made against the possibility of an end to the civil war. These include: an 
increase in popular mobilisation and the emergence of indigenous 
organisations at national level; the return of refugees from Mexico; and 
growing resistance to the civil patrols. In the wake of the Serrano-golpe, the 
hegemony of the political parties has all but collapsed in Guatemala and civil 
society is cautiously emerging as a political actor distinct and separate from 
the insurgent forces of the URNG. The guarantees obtained to treat returning 
refugees as civilians and grant them three years exemption from military 
service or participation in the civil patrols constituted a significant concession 
by the armed forces. However, progress to date has been uneven; many 
refugees have returned to highly militarised areas where the army continue 
to control most aspects of daily life, and on a number of occasions returned 
refugees have been forced to cross the Guatemalan-Mexican border in flight 
from army attacks. The emergence since 1990 of the internally displaced 
Comunidades de los Pueblos en Resistencia (CPRs) in the Ixcan, Peten and 
highlands of the Ixil triangle signals a challenge to the army's counter-
insurgency hegemony in the altiplano, given the CPRs' refusal to participate 
in the civil patrols or to live in model villages. However, army attacks 
against the CPRs continue, evidencing the fragility of gains and cautioning 
against an over-optimistic reading. 
As Richard Wilson has argued, the army have so enmeshed themselves into 
indigenous culture in rural Guatemala, that any prospect of immediate 
'demilitarisation' in the broadest sense of the word is unlikely.90 The 
persistence of the civil patrols and the army's omnipotent presence in all rural 
development efforts mean that the militarisation of rural society in highland 
Guatemala has long since exceeded the boundaries of physical coercion alone. 
It is questionable indeed whether in the case of such a traumatised society 
subject to such wholesale penetration by military counter-insurgency 
operations it is meaningful to talk of demilitarisation in the terms of a peace 
settlement or its immediate aftermath. The impact of developments in civil 
society may yet prove the key to a slow and cautious process of change in 
civil/military relations in Guatemala. Nonetheless, given the numerous 
precedents which exist, a return to widespread repression cannot be ruled 
out. 
The Guatemalan military is now firmly locked into the negotiating process 
which will continue to be a focus throughout 1994. However, given the 
military's refusal to make substantive concessions on the question of human 
rights, peace in the short term seems unlikely.91 Calls in November by the 
UN human rights expert appointed to Guatemala, Monica Pinto, for the 
immediate abolition of the PACs were flatly refused by Defence Minister 
General Mario Enriquez. De Leon himself has publicly reaffirmed his 
commitment to the PACs on numerous occasions. De Leon's support for the 
peace process is intrinsically linked to his domestic political fortunes, the 
latter far from guaranteed. Given the history of cyclical violence in 
Guatemala and the manifest inability of the URNG to guarantee the physical 
safety of its members were they to disarm and attempt reintegration, it seems 
that the presence of a UN international peace-keeping force (proposed in the 
agreement signed by both sides in January 1994) will be essential in the event 
of any future settlement. 
Conclusions 
Although the formal process of cease-fire, peace-making and (regime) 
transition is much more advanced in some countries of Central America than 
in others, it has nowhere reached a point at which a new, regular path of 
military behaviour and civil-military relations is clearly evident. As a result 
it would be misguided to talk yet of any 'consolidation' or firm pattern. 
Correspondingly, care should be exercised in drawing clear policy 
conclusions from experiences that are still underway, palpably fragile, and, 
on both internal and external fronts, liable to mutation and even reversal. 
Nonetheless, by early 1994 a number of broad tendencies can be identified. 
Although, as stated at the outset, the Central American armies were 
preoccupied primarily with achieving settlements on a national basis, neither 
the absence of a regional war nor the quite differing approach taken by three 
US administrations should obscure a perceptible regional aspect to the 
process of peacemaking and transition. Indeed, it is possible to assert the 
existence of a 'knock-on effect' starting with Esquipulas (1987), taking off 
with the first substantial Nicaraguan ceasefire (March 1988), accelerating in 
late 1989 (the FMLN offensive in November; the US invasion of Panama in 
December), being consolidated with the defeat of the FSLN in the February 
1990 elections, and reaching a natural - if scarcely 'logical' - peak with the 
1991-2 Salvadorean settlement. The region's officer corps observing these 
developments must have drawn mixed and divergent conclusions, but if the 
Guatemalans - predictably the last in line - evidently sought to avoid 
repeating the Salvadorean experience, they surely gained a certain sense of 
confidence from the shifting local and international conditions. It may be that 
the January 1994 uprising in Chiapas put a brake on this, not least if one 
takes the plausible view that the region's conflicts have been pursued far 
more upon local considerations than as expressions of the shifting balance of 
world forces and ideologies. But even if this proves to be the case and 
Guatemalan 'exceptionalism' is further prolonged, it is unlikely to persist in 
the same form and will undoubtedly manifest the influence of developments 
in the surrounding states. 
The process of ceasefire and transition has been shadowed by declining 
interest and involvement on the part of the US government. Indeed, with 
respect to the Clinton administration (1993-) there is a strong case for 
arguing that Central America was so low on the policy agenda that the 
military question was just as prey to congressional whim (as manipulated by 
Sen. Helms) as to any view in the State Department, let alone the White 
House. In the same vein, it would be misguided to assume that there was a 
coherent shift in US doctrinal influence on the armed forces, although in 
rapidly changing circumstances US military advisers sometimes plainly held 
and persuaded their audiences. Perhaps the most plausible scenario for the 
last years of the century is that which obtained during the 1960s and early 
1970s, when US management of military matters was largely tactically 
determined at embassy and attache level and without significant financial 
considerations. However, if there is now no guerrilla threat (or one that is 
massively reduced) at local level and no challenge emanating from Cuba, the 
region's armies have still been irreversibly transformed in some respects, not 
all of which are acceptable to Washington. 
One signal trend in the current transition, no doubt related to the rapid 
decline in US military aid from 1980s levels, is that towards consolidation 
and diversification of the armed forces' institutional economic structures. 
Whilst the antecedents and extent of such corporate holdings vary greatly 
across the region, a shift in the nature of the military's interests is evident 
throughout. Whereas previously accumulation of wealth amongst the officer 
corps constituted a kind of 'primitive individualism', personal fortunes 
amassed through such semi-licit means as land purchases, logging deals and 
trade in emeralds, IPMs throughout the region are currently extending the 
institutional portfolio of the armed forces into the areas of manufacturing, 
finance and commerce. Whilst criticism of 'burguesias armadas' are not 
without justification, this institutionalisation might, in some circumstances, 
more accurately be seen as a guarantor of current efforts to demilitarise - as 
in Nicaragua, where the development of the IPM constitutes an attempt to 
attend to the welfare claims of large numbers of decommissioned personnel. 
Military demands for a quid pro quo, or at the very least some minimal 
financial guarantees, in exchange for reduction in numbers or substantive 
withdrawal from the public sphere are only to be expected; it is arguably 
preferable to give retiring officers an officially structured and sanctioned 
pay-off which at least provides a more plausible framework for official 
oversight. However, clearly it is not only desirable but also imperative that 
those officers found guilty of human rights violations receive no such benefits 
and are dishonourably discharged. If the traditional impunity of the region's 
military is truly to be reduced, then trials and punitive sanctions are the 
preferred, if not always the most politically acceptable, option in such cases. 
Another consequence of the 1980s was the massive expansion of the 
military's involvement in cocaine and heroin trafficking throughout the 
region, a wholly less salubrious form of capital accumulation. Already 
significant in Central America by the end of the 1970s, narcotrafico took off 
in the subsequent decade, inevitably encouraged by the generalised climate 
of impunity prevailing across the isthmus. Such lawlessness was additionally 
fomented by the Reagan administration's drug-running operations to supply 
the contra which, by providing both sanction and substantial logistical 
support, aided those officers involved in cocaine smuggling to consolidate 
their hold on power. Particularly acute amongst the Guatemalan and 
Honduran armed forces - and almost sui generis in the case of Panama - the 
expansion of drug-trafficking by the military poses a serious threat to the 
formal command structure and escalafon, exacerbating factionalism amongst 
officers and inevitably increasing instability. This constitutes not only a 
threat to civil society but to the very foundations of the military institutions 
themselves. 
Drugs are but one factor behind the climate of increased crime, violence 
and delincuencia comun which has accelerated throughout the region with the 
end (or in the case of Guatemala, scaling down) of the civil wars. Whether 
rooted in motives of revenge (El Salvador) or a corollary of generalised 
socio-economic collapse (Nicaragua), the net effect of this phenomenon has 
been to validate the official role of police forces in the maintenance of 
domestic order, even though police practice in many specific instances 
continues to provide considerable cause for concern. In contrast to El 
Salvador, where guidelines governing the establishment and functions of the 
PNC were drawn up as part of the peace negotiations, the make-up and 
institutional remit of police forces elsewhere in the region is a function of 
various factors including: securing the demobilisation of rebel forces 
(Nicaragua), the abolition of the army (Panama), or the degree of control still 
exercised over the police by the armed forces (Honduras and Guatemala). In 
the present climate, the need for more stringent and efficient institutional 
regulation of the police is ever more apparent. However, the acute partiality 
and corruption demonstrated across the region by that very highest of legal 
institutions, the Supreme Court, raises the question of which bodies are 
indeed capable of carrying out this oversight. Whilst an examination of the 
judiciary is beyond the scope of this paper, it might reasonably be reckoned 
that the recent performance of Supreme Court Presidents Juan Jose Rodil 
Peralta (Guatemala), Oswaldo Ramos Soto (Honduras) - both of whom 
presided over highly politicised and allegedly corrupt bodies - or Mauricio 
Gutierrez Castro, currently running for reelection in El Salvador (this despite 
being singled out for criticism in the UN Truth Commission report), have 
done little to encourage faith in the impartiality or regulatory abilities of the 
courts. 
Perhaps the most noxious and enduring consequence of the civil wars of the 
1980s is not, indeed, directly institutional at all but, rather, the influence they 
had on the outlook and behaviour of the societies affected, well beyond those 
who participated or were directly prejudiced by the conflicts. In the 
immediate aftermath of the wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador both lawful 
and peaceable conduct were distinctly tenuous, and there was a profusion of 
armaments as well as a proclivity - as yet contained - for acts of revenge. 
However, in the still unresolved case of Guatemala one may readily refer to 
a 'militarised culture' - at least in many zones of the country - that extends 
well beyond current or former soldiers in the state and rebel armies. If 
Honduras has witnessed a strong reaction to this in the campaign to abolish 
conscription - one of the central expressions of military authority in civil 
society - it is notable that this has been resisted with unswerving resilience 
in Guatemala, not just for recruitment to the regular military forces but also 
for the salients they have driven deep into society via the Comisionados and 
the PACs. Here, then, one should beware the extension of the 'culture of 
war' generated by the awful exigencies of fighting to one that follows this 
experience but still prescribes behaviour in 'peacetime' that is based on the 
same brutal assumptions. 
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